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 TAGS: UR, NATO  
 SUBJECT: APAG 1983: THE SOVIET UNION IN THE THIRD  
 WORLD

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THERE FOLLOWS US CONTRIBUTION TO 1983 APAG MEETING, WHICH IS TO BE HELD OCTOBER 9-12 AT THE HOMESTEAD, NEAR HOT SPRINGS, VIRGINIA. THE TOPIC FOR THIS YEAR'S MEETING IS "SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD USNATO SHOULD CIRCULATE PAPER TO ASYG DANNENBRING AND TO ALLIES ALL OTHER ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD DELIVER TEXT TO HOST GOVERNMENT APAG REPRESENTATIVES, INDICATING THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING THEM IN US AND RECEIVING THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUMMARY: IN THE PAST TWO YEARS THE MOMENTUM OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS SLOWED SOMEWHAT, WITH SIGNS THAT PRIORITIES, COSTS, AND RISKS ARE BEING MORE CAREFULLY WEIGHED THAN IN THE LAST YEARS OF BREZHNEV'S RULE. THIS HAS, HOWEVER, PRODUCED NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TO DATE. THE MILITARY

CAPABILITIES, STRATEGIC POSITIONS, AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS ACCUMULATED IN THE PAST DECADE ARE STILL AVAILABLE AND ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE WESTERN INTERESTS. AND IN TWO CRITICAL AREAS -- THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL AMERICA -- SOVIET POLICY HAS SHOWN A READINESS TO ACCEPT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED RISKS IN MOUNTING THIS CHALLENGE.

AN EFFECTIVE WESTERN RESPONSE REQUIRES THE CONTINUED

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REBUILDING OF THE FULL ARRAY OF OUR ASSETS, INCLUDING INCREASED MILITARY STRENGTH AND RELIABLE MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIPS. COORDINATED AND TARGETED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AND REGIONAL PEACE-MAKING AND PEACE-KEEPING EFFORTS. IN THIS WAY THE WEST CAN BOLSTER FRIENDLY THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS WHILE DEALING VIGOROUSLY WITH THE UNDERLYING INDIGENOUS CONDITIONS THAT CREATE SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES. WE SHOULD ALSO PLACE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON POLICIES THAT WEAKEN THE TIES BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS MOST DANGEROUS CLIENTS AND SURROGATES. A WEAKENING OF THESE TIES WILL STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET REVIEW OF PRIORITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD.

## I. OVERVIEW

TWO YEARS AGO, AT THE 1981 APAG MEETING, PARTICIPANTS PRESENTED APPRAISALS OF SOVIET ACTIVISM AND OBJECTIVES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OUTLINED WESTERN POLICIES FOR COUNTERING MOSCOW'S EFFORTS. TODAY THE OUTLOOK OF THOSE PAPERS PROVIDES A USEFUL BENCHMARK, TO MEASURE HOW WELL SOVIET POLICIES SINCE THEN HAVE FIT THE PATTERN OF OUR EXPECTATIONS, HOW ADEQUATE THE WEST'S RESPONSE HAS BEEN, AND HOW OUR POLICIES SHOULD BE ADAPTED TO CHANGING FUTURE REQUIREMENTS.

THE FOLLOWING PROPOSITIONS HAVE DEFINED OUR OUTLOOK ON SOVIET POLICY:

A. SOVIET STRATEGIES IN THE THIRD WORLD OPERATE ON A FIELD OF GREAT DIVERSITY, WHOSE RECURRENT INSTABILITY PRESENTS CONTINUING OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVOLVEMENT AND INTERFERENCE.

THE TERM "THIRD WORLD"-(WITH ITS MANY EQUIVALENTS, SUCH AS "DEVELOPING COUNTRIES") TRIES TO CAPTURE A REALITY TOO BROAD FOR A SINGLE PHRASE, MUCH LESS A SINGLE POLICY. THE POLITICAL REALITIES TO WHICH OUR OWN AND SOVIET POLICIES MUST ADAPT VARY FROM CONTINENT TO CONTINENT, REGION TO REGION, COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, AND EVEN FROM ONE LOCALITY

TO ANOTHER.

IN DEALING WITH THESE STATES, WESTERN POLICY DOES NOT TAKE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AS ITS STARTING POINT; OUR UNDERLYING INTEREST IS RATHER IN PURSUING MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS AT ALL LEVELS, WHICH WE EXPECT TO HAVE THE LONG-TERM EFFECT OF PROMOTING THIRD WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH, POLITICAL DEMOCRATIZATION AND REGIONAL PEACE. SOVIET POLICY COMPLICATES THE PICTURE, HOWEVER, FOR ONE COROLLARY OF THE THIRD WORLD'S DIVERSITY HAS BEEN ITS POLITICAL INSTABILITY, BOTH WITHIN AND AMONG STATES. IN EXPLOITING THIS, THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED A HIGHLY DIFFERENTIATED ARRAY OF POLICIES FOR ENLARGING THEIR INFLUENCE AND EXTENDING THEIR PRESENCE.

DESPITE ITS REPUTATION FOR INEPT, INSENSITIVE HANDLING OF DEVELOPING STATES, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT BEEN DAUNTED BY THIRD WORLD DIVERSITY. IT HAS INTERFERED IN AREAS JUST EMERGING FROM COLONIAL RULE, AND IN OTHERS THAT NEVER EXPERIENCED IT. IT HAS ABETTED COUP ATTEMPTS, AND DEALT EFFECTIVELY WITH ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS. IT HAS INFLUENCED BOTH CIVIL WARS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. IT HAS BEEN ACTIVE BOTH IN CASES THAT PRESENTED A CLEAR EAST-WEST CONFLICT AND IN OTHERS THAT DID NOT. IT HAS ACHIEVED SUCCESS WHERE WESTERN INTERESTS WERE HIGH, AND WHERE THEY WERE NOT. IT HAS BUILT ON SUCCESS AND RESPONDED RESILIENTLY TO SOME CONSPICUOUS AND WELL-KNOWN FAILURES. IN SHORT,

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WHILE EXPERIENCING ITS SHARE OF REVERSSES, SOVIET POLICY HAS USED VARIED INSTRUMENTS AND CONSIDERABLE INSIGHT IN EXPLOITING THIRD WORLD DIVERSITY.

B. SOVIET POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE EAST-WEST COMPETITION, AND WILL FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE BE DESIGNED TO WEAKEN THE POSITION OF THE WEST -- MILITARILY, POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, IDEOLOGICALLY.

SOVIET INTEREST IN THE THIRD WORLD CAN BE TRACED -- BOTH HISTORICALLY AND INTELLECTUALLY -- TO THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT THE DEVELOPING STATES ARE THOUGHT TO PRESENT FOR AFFECTING THE GLOBAL "CORRELATION OF FORCES." MORE RECENTLY, SOVIET GLOBAL POLICY AND PRESENCE HAVE BEEN ASSERTED TO BE MATTERS OF "ENTITLEMENT" -- THE LEGITIMATE CLAIMS OF A SUPERPOWER. FINALLY, MOSCOW'S RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING STATES HELP TO CREATE A MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE THAT INCREASES ITS ABILITY TO CONDUCT WARTIME OPERATIONS. ALL THREE OF THESE PERSPECTIVES

IMPLY A HIGH PRIORITY FOR SOVIET POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD AND HAVE GIVEN THEM A HIGHLY COMPETITIVE CAST.

NEVERTHELESS, WESTERN AND SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE THIRD WORLD REMAIN ASYMMETRICAL. THE WEST'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY STAKE IS LARGE AND OFTEN CRITICAL; BY CONTRAST, THE SOVIET UNION'S EFFORT TO EXPAND ITS POWER AMONG THE DEVELOPING STATES HAS BEEN FAR OUT OF PROPORTION TO THE GROWTH OF ITS INTERESTS AS WE WOULD DEFINE THEM. TO BE SURE, IN DEALINGS WITH SOME SMALL GROUP OF STATES, SOVIET SECURITY IS AT ISSUE; SOVIET TRADE WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IS ALSO GROWING (SLOWLY), ALONG WITH INVESTMENT (MORE SLOWLY). BUT THE REAL SOVIET STAKE IN THE THIRD WORLD IS ITS NETWORK OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS, ABOVE ALL WITH GOVERNMENTS AND WOULD-BE GOVERNMENTS OF A MARXIST ORIENTATION. THESE TIES ARE OF COURSE SUBJECT TO OCCASIONAL REVERSSES, BUT THE SOVIET UNION'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF ITS NATIONAL ECONOMY ARE NOT AT RISK. WHAT CAN BE LOST ARE THE POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS AND STRATEGIC POSITIONS FROM WHICH TO CHALLENGE THE WEST (AND, IT SHOULD BE ADDED, CHINA).

FOR THIS REASON, THE GROWTH OF SOVIET ACTIVISM IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS NOT PRODUCED ANY CORRESPONDING SOVIET INTEREST IN STABILITY OR THE STATUS QUO. LACKING A TRULY VITAL STAKE IN THE THIRD WORLD, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS MAY ALSO FIND IT EASIER THAN THE WEST WOULD TO REASSESS THEIR APPROACH. IF THE COSTS AND RISKS OF AN ACTIVIST POLICY RISE, OR IF IT APPEARS THAT SECURITY CONCERN IN ANOTHER AREA ARE MORE PRESSING.

C. IN THE PAST DECADE, MORE ACTIVE SOVIET POLICIES HAVE BEEN AIDED BY EXPANDED MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND BY EXPANDED FORMS OF COLLABORATION WITH THIRD WORLD STATES.

ANALYSES OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR FREQUENTLY MISREPRESENT IT AS EITHER DEEPLY CAUTIOUS OR INCREASINGLY RECKLESS. IN FACT, THE PATTERN OF SOVIET CONDUCT INVOLVES ACCEPTANCE OF CONSIDERABLE RISK, SUPPLEMENTED BY MAJOR EFFORTS TO MANAGE THE DANGERS AND PREVENT A LOSS OF CONTROL.

IN THE 70'S, Owing TO THEIR OWN INCREASED STRENGTH AND EXPANDED COOPERATION WITH THIRD WORLD CLIENTS, THE SOVIETS WEREABLE TO PURSUE GREATER ACTIVISM WITHOUT

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FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERING THIS PREFERRED PATTERN OF CAREFULLYMANAGED RISK. WHERE THE US OR A MAJOR ALLY

HAS BEEN WILLING AND ABLE TO TAKE STEPS THAT MADE SOVIET SUCCESS QUESTIONABLE. MOSCOW HAS USUALLY EXERCISED GREATER CAUTION. THE USE OF SURROGATES, HOWEVER, PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT INNOVATION OF RECENT SOVIET POLICY, HAS SERVED TO LIMIT BOTH COSTS AND RISKS WHILE REALIZING IMPORTANT STRATEGIC GAINS.

SOVIET CLIENT TIES HAVE BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY DIVERSE --FROM THE ALL-PURPOSE, MULTI-CONTINENT USE OF CUBAN COMBAT FORCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE HORN, AND CENTRAL AMERICA; TO THE SUPPLY OF ARMS (INCLUDING FRONT-LINE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET AIR-DEFENSE MISSILES AND CREWS) IN SUPPORT OF SYRIA AGAINST HER NEIGHBORS. THE SOVIETS HAVE BECOME THE PRINCIPAL ARMS SUPPLIER OF OVER 34 STATES, TWICE AS MANY AS A DECADE AGO, AND APPROXIMATELY 20,000 OF THEIR OWN OR BLOC MILITARY PERSONNEL (NOT INCLUDING CUBANS) ARE LOCATED IN MORE THAN 30 THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. PARALLEL EFFORTS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE BLOC HAVE HELPED TO HASTEN AND THEN TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE PRO-SOVIET ORIENTATION OF CERTAIN DEVELOPING STATES, HELPING TO PREVENT REALIGNMENT. AMONG OTHER BENEFITS, ALL THESE RELATIONSHIPS HAVE MADE UP FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIVELY LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PROJECT AND SUPPORT POWER IN REGIONS NOT BORDERING IT, AND HAVE ENABLED IT TO PURSUE ACTIVE POLICIES IN REGIONS WHERE ITS ROLE HAD UNTIL RECENTLY BEEN MARGINAL. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, THESE RELATIONSHIPS HAVE ENABLED THE SOVIET UNION TO INVOLVE ITSELF BROADLY IN THIRD WORLD POLITICS, UNCONSTRAINED BY A STRICT CALCULATION OF ITS PRIORITIES.

OBVIOUSLY, GIVEN THE DIVERSITY OF THE TIES BETWEEN THEM, SOVIET AND CLIENT GOALS HAVE NOT ALWAYS COINCIDED, AND WHEN NECESSARY THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO SACRIFICE THEIR CLIENTS' INTERESTS. YET BECAUSE CLIENTS HAVE BEEN SO VALUABLE TO SOVIET POLICY AS A WHOLE, THESE DIFFERENCES HAVE NOT ALWAYS ACTED AS A MAJOR RESTRAINT ON SOVIET CONDUCT. TO THE CONTRARY, IN SOME INSTANCES THEY MAY EVEN HAVE ACTED TO ESCALATE SOVIET PURPOSES AND TO DEEPEN THIRD WORLD INVOLVEMENTS.

D. THE WEST COMMANDS A MUCH FULLER ARRAY OF ASSETS FOR COMPETING WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE THIRD WORLD ON LEVELS OTHER THAN THE MILITARY PLANE. -

AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE SOVIET UNION, DESPITE THE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE EXPANSION OF ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE DEVELOPING AREAS, REMAINS PRINCIPALLY

RELIANT ON THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT USE OF MILITARY POWER. OF COURSE, THE WEST CAN HARDLY HOPE TO COUNTER SOVIET POLICIES MERELY BY TRYING TO EMPHASIZE THOSE ASPECTS OF POWER IN WHICH WE HOLD SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES. THE REBUILDING OF OUR MILITARY ASSETS, AND OUR ABILITY TO BRING THEM TO BEAR QUICKLY WHERE AND WHEN NEEDED, MUST REMAIN A HIGH PRIORITY THROUGHOUT THIS DECADE.

YET WE ARE UNLIKELY EVER TO HAVE AS WIDE A MARGIN OF MILITARY ADVANTAGES AS EXISTS IN OTHER DIMENSIONS OF POWER -- IN THE DYNAMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION OF WESTERN ECONOMIES, IN THE REVOLUTIONARY IMPACT OF OUR IDEAS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND IN THE BROAD ACCESS THAT AN EVEN-HANDED AND IMAGINATIVE DIPLOMACY CREATES. IF --BUT ONLY IF-- THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, IN BOTH ITS DIRECT AND ITS INDIRECT FORMS, CAN

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BE NEUTRALIZED. THESE OTHER VERY REAL ADVANTAGES OF THE WEST, SYSTEMATICALLY UTILIZED, WILL TELL IN OUR FAVOR.

II. RECENT SOVIET POLICY

IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, AS IN THE 70'S, SOVIET ACTIVISM IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS INVOLVED THE EXPLOITATION OF NOW-FAMILIAR SYNDROMES: UNSTABLE REGIMES, ECONOMIC DISEQUILIBRIUM (WHETHER TOO RAPID GROWTH OR TOO SLOW, TOO NARROWLY DISTRIBUTED OR TOO WIDELY), RADICAL MOVEMENTS SEEKING OUTSIDE SPONSORS, REGIONAL CONFLICTS, AND SO FORTH. YET THE RECENT RECORD OF SOVIET POLICY ALSO CONFIRMS SOME OF THE IMPORTANT LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH IT MUST OPERATE. SOVIET EFFORTS ARE CONDUCTED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF MORE OPENLY COMPETITIVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS, IN WHICH THE WEST'S POSITION HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED BY A BROADER CONSENSUS ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM ON THE NATURE OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES AND ON THE NEED TO COUNTER THEM ACTIVELY. THE RECENT KAL INCIDENT MAY HAVE BROADENED THIS CONSENSUS. EQUALY IMPORTANT, THIS PERIOD HAS SEEN SUBSTANTIAL OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD ITSELF THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE FOUND VERY DIFFICULT TO EXPLOIT.

SINCE 1981:

-- POLITICAL INSTABILITY HAS PROVIDED NO CERTAIN OPENING FOR SOVIET PENETRATION. EVEN IN STATES WHERE THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE PAST HAS SOMETIMES BEEN VERY LARGE. QUITE CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS IN IRAN SINCE THE SHAH AND IN EGYPT SINCE SADAT HAVE FAILED TO RESTORE OLDFOOTHOLDS. IN THE FORMER CASE, IN FACT, THE

PRO-SOVIET TUDEH ORGANIZATION HAS BECOME THE TARGET OF A MAJOR GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN; SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON IRAN NOW DESPAIR OF GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS.

-- OUTRIGHT WARFARE BETWEEN WESTERN AND DEVELOPING STATES HAS PROVIDED NO EASY OPENING TO IMPROVE SOVIET ACCESS, MUCH LESS FOR CLOSE COOPERATION. EVEN AT ITS HEIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FALKLANDS WAR DID NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE SOVIET TIES WITH ARGENTINA OR ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA, AND THE LASTING IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT HAS (FROM THE SOVIET STANDPOINT) BEEN EVEN LESS. SIMILARLY, PROLONGED WARFARE BETWEEN DEVELOPING STATES (THE PREMIER CASE: IRAQ AND IRAN) HAS NOT PROMOTED SOVIET INVOLVEMENT, OR HELPED MOSCOW TO INTERPOSE ITSELF DIPLOMATICALLY.

-- SEVERE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN NO GUARANTEE OF POLITICAL TURMOIL. IN WHICH SOVIET-SPONSORED GROUPS COULD GALVANIZE A RADICAL OPPOSITION TO PRO-WESTERN REGIMES. NIGERIA AND BRAZIL, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE AMONG THE WALKING WOUNDED OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS, HAVE REMAINED LARGELY IMMUNE TO RADICALISM AND POLITICAL DISINTEGRATION.

-- INTIMIDATING SHOWS OF FORCE, EVEN WHEN THEY APPEAR TO MANY IN THE WEST AS HOPELESS FAITS ACCOMPLIS, HAVE NOT REGULARLY CREATED ANY DISPOSITION AMONG THREATENED NEIGHBORING STATES TO ACCOMMODATE THE SOVIETS. ASEAN'S ANTI-MOSCOW INCLINATIONS HAVE IF ANYTHING BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA AND BY THE GROWING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA. SIMILARLY, PAKISTAN HAS NOT SHOWN MORE THAN TACTICAL INTEREST IN A SOVIET-STYLE AFGHAN SETTLEMENT, DESPITE THE BURDEN IMPOSED ON IT BY THE AFGHAN WAR.

-- THE CONSOLIDATION OF PRO-SOVIET FACTIONS IN NEW

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REVOLUTIONARY REGIMES, AND AN APING OF SOVIET METHODS, HAS NOT MADE THEM PROOF AGAINST RESURGENT OPPPOSITION. IN NICARAGUA, SANDINISTA RELIANCE ON SOVIET-BLOC ADVISERS HAS NOT SECURED THE REGIME AGAINST THE COALESCENCE OF ARMED OPPPOSITION GROUPS. IN FACT, EVERY OTHER SOVIET CLIENT ACQUIRED SINCE 1975 --ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, ETHIOPIA, -SOUTH YEMEN, KAMPUCHEA, AFGHANISTAN-- NOW FACES A SERIOUS(AND GROWING) INTERNAL THREAT.

-- DIRECT SPONSORSHIP OF RADICAL "NATIONAL LIBERATION" GROUPS HAS NOT GIVEN THE SOVIETS THE LEVERAGE WITH WHICH TO ADJUDICATE INTERNAL STRUGGLES, OR TO SUSTAIN A

SHARP FOCUS ON ANTI-WESTERN GOALS. THE SPLINTERING OF THE PLO AFTER ITS DEFEAT IN LEBANON WAS UNDERTAKEN BY THE PRINCIPAL MIDDLE EASTERN RECIPIENT OF SOVIET AID, SYRIA, AND HAS SERIOUSLY WEAKENED ONE OF THE MAIN INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION.

SOME OF THESE EXAMPLES INVOLVE A SIGNIFICANT FRUSTRATION OF SOVIET EFFORT, AND SHOULD BE SEEN AS MAJOR FAILURES OR REVERSES FOR MOSCOW'S POLICIES. THEY MAY EVEN SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO DEVOTE MORE OF THEIR ENERGY AND RESOURCES TO PRESERVE THE STRATEGIC POSITIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED IN THE PAST DECADE, AND THAT OPPORTUNITIES TO ESTABLISH NEW ONES WILL BE FEWER IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

NEVERTHELESS, WHILE POSITIVE FOR THE WEST, THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE BY NO MEANS PRODUCED A PATTERN OF MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET BEHAVIOR ON THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES. TO THE CONTRARY, THE SOVIETS' DETERMINATION AND ABILITY TO SUSTAIN AN ACTIVE POLICY HAVE BEEN SHOWN BY THEIR READINESS, INTER ALIA, TO:

-- RUN INCREASED RISKS OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST (AS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND SYRIA-LEBANON).

-- ABSORB INCREASING MILITARY AND POLITICAL COSTS WHILE RIDING OUT ARMED OCCUPATIONS AND OBSTRUCTING DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS (AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA ARE CONSPICUOUS EXAMPLES);

-- SUSTAIN INCREASING MATERIAL COSTS TO KEEP THEIR MOST VALUABLE THIRD WORLD CLIENTS AFLOAT (ABOVE ALL, CUBA AND VIETNAM), DESPITE THE DEEPENING IMPACT OF SUPPORT FOR THESE CLIENTS ON MOSCOW'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE US;

OF THE ABOVE INSTANCES, THE MOST INTERESTING AND REVEALING CASES OF SOVIET THIRD WORLD POLICY IN THE PAST TWO YEARS HAVE BEEN THE MIDDLE EAST/PERSIAN GULF AND CENTRAL AMERICA. SOVIET POLICIES TOWARD THESE REGIONS DIFFER SHARPLY FROM EACH OTHER, AS THEY ALWAYS HAVE IN THE PAST:

-- THE MIDDLE EAST HAS HISTORICALLY ENJOYED HIGH PRIORITY IN SOVIET POLICY BUT HAS OVER THE PAST DECADE BEEN MARKED BY MAJOR REVERSSES; CENTRAL AMERICA'S TRADITIONALLY LOW PRIORITY APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN

RE-EVALUATED IN LIGHT OF A MAJOR SUCCESS IN THE PAST HALF DECADE.

-- IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOVIET POLICY HAS SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT EXISTING INTER-STATE CONFLICTS WITHIN THE

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REGION, WITH RELATIVELY UNIDEOLOGICAL POLICIES; IN CENTRAL AMERICA, IT HAS RECENTLY BEEN REORIENTED TOWARD SUBVERSION AND SUPPORT FOR RADICAL GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS.

-- IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SOVIETS HOPE TO SHOW THAT POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CURRENTS ARE NOT UNIFORMLY AGAINST THEM, EVEN THOUGH THEIR EFFORTS OF THE PAST FIVE YEARS HAVE ONLY STIMULATED STRONGER WESTERN INTEREST IN AN AREA "CLOSE TO SOVIET BORDERS;" IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE SOVIETS' OBJECTIVE IS TO SHOW THAT REGIONAL CURRENTS ARE NOW RUNNING STRONGLY AGAINST THE US, IN HOPES OF CLAIMING INCREASED AMERICAN ATTENTION AND RESOURCES, AND DIVERTING THEM FROM OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD.

DESPITE THESE DIFFERENCES, HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN A CRITICAL COMMON ELEMENT IN RECENT SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE TWO REGIONS. IN EACH CASE, THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD TO WEIGH THE INCREASED RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE US, TO WHICH THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR CLIENTS WERE EXPOSING THEM, AGAINST THE RISK OF SHOWING THEMSELVES TO BE UNRELIABLE PATRONS. THE EVIDENT SOVIET DECISION WAS TO ACCEPT THE RISK OF CONFRONTATION, NOT ONLY BY INCREASING ITS MILITARY SUPPLIES BUT BY CROSSING A THRESHOLD OF SUPPORT OVER WHICH IT HAD EARLIER HESITATED TO PASS.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THIS INVOLVED A SHARP INCREASE IN THE CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET MISSILES PROVIDED TO SYRIA AND IN THE NUMBERS OF SOVIET PERSONNEL NEEDED TO MANAGE THEM. THIS WAS PRESUMABLY SEEN AS NECESSARY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO REMAIN A PARTICIPANT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. YET AFTER THE HUMILIATION OF SOVIET ARMAMENTS IN THE 1982 LEBANON WAR, AND WITH YET ANOTHER DISABLING ISRAELI STRIKE AGAINST THE NEW MISSILES (AND SOVIET SUPPORT TROOPS) A SIGNIFICANT POSSIBILITY, THIS STEP REPRESENTED A MAJOR INCREASE IN THE POLITICAL STAKES. NOT ONLY WAS THE RISK OF CONFRONTATION HIGHER BUT THE IMPACT OF A SECOND HUMILIATING DEFEAT WOULD HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER.

SIMILARLY, IN CENTRAL AMERICA THE SOVIETS IN 1983 BEGAN FOR THE FIRST TIME TO PROVIDE WEAPONS DIRECTLY TO

NICARAGUA, RATHER THAN ONLY THROUGH THEIR INTERMEDIARIES. AT THE SAME TIME, AS A DEMONSTRATION OF SUPPORT FOR HAVANA AGAINST POSSIBLE US PRESSURES, MOSCOW SHARPLY INCREASED WEAPONS DELIVERIES TO CUBA.

THIS PAIR OF ACTIONS HAS EXPOSED THE SOVIETS TO UNUSUALLY HIGH RISK. DESPITE AN EMPHASIS ON DEFENSIVE MEASURES, EACH ACTION EMBOLDENED THE SOVIET CLIENT TO PURSUE ITS CONFRONTATION WITH THE US (OR INITIALLY, IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH ISRAEL) AND DID SO WHEN THE SOVIETS WOULD BE HARD PUT, AND THEREFORE PROBABLY DISINCLINED, TO COME TO ITS DEFENSE. RECOGNIZING THIS, MOSCOW APPEARS TO HAVE TRIED, AS IT USUALLY DOES, TO LIMIT THE RISKS IN OTHER WAYS-- RESTRICTING ITS SUPPORT FOR SYRIA TO SYRIAN TERRITORY (RATHER THAN EXTEND AN UMBRELLA OVER LEBANON), AND REPORTEDLY CAUTIONING AGAINST NICARAGUAN ACTIVITIES BEYOND ITS BORDERS. (THE SOVIET COMMITMENT EVEN TO THE MANAGUA GOVERNMENT ITSELF HAS NOT BEEN EMPHATIC.)

THE BROAD PATTERN IN THESE CASES MAY BE SPREADING TO OTHER AREAS. THERE IS, FOR EXAMPLE, SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS LACK ENTHUSIASM FOR LIBYA'S LATEST FORAY INTO CHAD. THERE IS, HOWEVER, ALSO REASON TO BELIEVE

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THAT, AS IN 1981, THEIR TECHNICAL ADVISERS ARE AGAIN PRESENT TO ASSIST WITH LIBYAN LOGISTICS. MOSCOW CONTINUES TO WANT TO HAVE ITS POLICIES BOTH WAYS: IT PROBES AGGRESSIVELY FOR POSSIBLE GAINS WHILE KEEPING ITSELF FREE TO PULL BACK IF SERIOUS RESISTANCE APPEARS AND TO SACRIFICE ITS PROXY'S OBJECTIVES IF NECESSARY.

**III. RESTRAINING SOVIET POLICY**

THE RECENT SOVIET RECORD IN THE THIRD WORLD SUGGESTS THE DIVERSITY OF FACTORS THAT HAVE GOVERNED MOSCOW'S POLICY AND WILL SHAPE BOTH THE OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES IT IS LIKELY TO FACE OVER THE REST OF THE DECADE. SOVIET STRATEGY WILL CONFRONT SUCH TASKS AS:

- MANAGING THE RISKS OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION WHILE CHALLENGING WESTERN INTERESTS;
- ADJUSTING TO INCREASED RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS;
- PREVENTING INTERNAL INSTABILITY AMONG PRO-SOVIET DEVELOPING STATES FROM AFFECTING THEIR CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS; AND
- DEALING WITH THE RESISTANCE OF THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM.

THE WEST NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND THE EXTENT TO WHICH EACH OF THESE FACTORS CAN RESTRAIN SOVIET CONDUCT. WE NEED A STRATEGY FOR EACH DIMENSION OF THE COMPETITION, SO AS TO MAXIMIZE OBSTACLES AND FORECLOSE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET POLICY, WHILE STRENGTHENING PRESSURES FOR A REVIEW OF SOVIET PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES.

A. RISK. WITH SOME IMPORTANT EXCEPTIONS, THE PAST DECADE'S RISING SOVIET ACTIVISM IN THE THIRD WORLD DID NOT APPEAR TO REFLECT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED RISK-TAKING. THE DANGERS FACED BY MOSCOW WERE LIMITED, FIRST, BY THE SHIFT OF THE OVERALL MILITARY BALANCE IN THEIR FAVOR; SECOND, BY THE WIDER USE OF SURROGATES; AND THIRD, BY A PERCEIVED RETRENCHMENT OF WESTERN CAPABILITIES IN SPECIFIC REGIONS AND TO SOME EXTENT EVEN OF WESTERN INTERESTS. OUR POLICIES ARE ADDRESSING ALL THREE OF THESE FACTORS.

THE BEDROCK OF SUCH AN EFFORT IS OF COURSE WESTERN DETERMINATION TO STRENGTHEN FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE THE TARGETS OF SOVIET POLICY AND CLIENTS. FOR SECURE REGIONAL POWER BALANCES ARE THE MOST RELIABLE DETERRENT TO MILITARY CHALLENGES. IN THE THIRD WORLD AS IN EUROPE, IF THE PROSPECT OF A QUICK VICTORY IS CLOSED OFF, THE SOVIETS ARE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO RETHINK. IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, THEY MAY HAVE SUPPORTED THE INSURGENCY IN EL SALVADOR WITH THE NEARLY EFFORTLESS WIN OF NICARAGUA IN MIND; WE WANT FUTURE SOVIET COMMITMENTS TO BE WEIGHED MORE CAREFULLY.

NOTHING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR STRENGTHENING VULNERABLE STATES THAN AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY ASSISTANCE POLICY, WHICH BOLSTERS THEIR OVERALL SECURITY EVEN BEFORE THEY GET INTO TROUBLE AND MEETS THEIR EMERGENCY ARMS NEEDS WHEN THEY DO. TO INCREASE SOVIET RISKS SIGNIFICANTLY, HOWEVER, IT MUST ALSO BE CLEAR THAT WE CAN --AND WILL-- STAND BEHIND THOSE WE HAVE TRIED TO STRENGTHEN. IN DOING SO, THE FIRST REQUIREMENT IS AN ABILITY TO REACT RAPIDLY TO CHALLENGES; THE CONSTRUCTIVE WESTERN RESPONSE TO THIS SUMMER'S LIBYAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST CHAD ACHIEVED A PROVISIONAL SUCCESS ONLY BECAUSE IT WAS

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MOBILIZED QUICKLY ENOUGH TO STEM A FAST-MOVING MILITARY TIDE. (AND WHEN THAT HAPPENED, MOSCOW BEGAN -- ALSO PROVISIONALLY -- TO DISSOCIATE ITSELF FROM QADHAFI'S INVOLVEMENT.) THE NEW US CENTRAL COMMAND WAS CREATED WITH CONTINGENCIES PRECISELY LIKE THIS IN MIND.

THE SECOND REQUIREMENT IS TO SUSTAIN WESTERN SUPPORT ONCE IT IS GIVEN. PROTECTING AND ADAPTING THE ROLE OF THE MNF IN LEBANON, FOR EXAMPLE, IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THIS IS PRECISELY THE AREA WHERE INCREASED SOVIET RISK-TAKING HAS BEEN MOST NOTICEABLE, AND WHERE THE SOVIET UNION HAS IMPROVED ITS POSITION SUBSTANTIALLY AS A RESULT. THE WITHDRAWAL OF WESTERN FORCES UNDER PRESSURE, AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF LEBANON ON SYRIAN TERMS THAT WOULD LIKELY FOLLOW, WOULD REPRESENT THE CULMINATING PAYOFF FOR MOSCOW'S RISKS, THEREBY PERHAPS CONFIRMING THE VALUE OF BOLD SOVIET GAMBLERS.

OVER THE LONGER TERM, OUR GOAL IS TO ENCOURAGE MUTUAL DOUBT BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THEIR CLIENTS -- ON THE SOVIET SIDE, BY DEMONSTRATING THAT ACTIVE PURSUIT OF CLIENT GOALS EXPOSES THEM TO DANGERS OUT OF PROPORTION TO THE EXPECTED PAYOFF; ON THE CLIENTS' SIDE, BY SHOWING THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT ALWAYS STAND BEHIND THEM. SUCH DOUBT CAN BE ONE OF THE CRUCIAL INGREDIENTS IN THE SUCCESS OF WESTERN EFFORTS AT REGIONAL PEACE-MAKING. STATES LACKING RELIABLE SOVIET SUPPORT ARE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO EXPLORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE WEST AND WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS. THE EXAMPLE OF EGYPT --A SUCCESS STORY OF WESTERN DIPLOMACY-- SUGGESTS HOW MUCH EFFORT MUST GO INTO INCREASING THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THEIR CLIENTS; IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY HAPPEN AUTOMATICALLY.

FINALLY, SOVIET RISK-CALCULATIONS ARE NOT AFFECTED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE BALANCE OF POWER AND INITIATIVES WITHIN THE NARROW CONTEXT OF A SPECIFIC REGIONAL CONFLICT. RECENT SOVIET ANALYSES HAVE MADE AN INTERESTING NEW LINK BETWEEN THE THIRD WORLD AND CORE EAST-WEST MILITARY RELATIONSHIP, ARGUING THAT THE SOVIET UNION ADVANCES THE "NATIONAL LIBERATION" CAUSE BEST BY EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSING THE THREAT TO PEACE ALLEGEDLY POSED BY, FOR EXAMPLE, PROSPECTIVE INF DEPLOYMENTS. IN OTHER WORDS, MOSCOW MAY BELIEVE THAT IN THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS IT WILL HAVE TO REASSERT ITS TRADITIONAL FOCUS ON EUROPE, POSSIBLY AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER, RELATIVELY PERIPHERAL AREAS OF COMPETITION. (AS A-RECENT PRAVDA-ARTICLE PUT IT, "(T)HE IMPLEMENTATION OF US PLANS IN EUROPE WILL LEAD TO A DRAMATIC HEIGHTENING OF THE DANGER OF WAR ... AND WILL CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE PROTECTION OF THE DEVELOPING-COUNTRIES' VITAL INTERESTS BECOMES EVEN MORE DIFFICULT." EMPHASIS ADDED.)

IN ADDRESSING OUR OUT-OF-AREA CONCERNs, IN OTHER WORDS, NATO SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE DIFFICULTIES WE FACE MAY DEPEND IN LARGE PART ON HOW PREOCCUPIED THE SOVIETS ARE BY SECURITY QUESTIONS WITHIN EUROPE ITSELF.

B. RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS BECOME MORE EXPENSIVE. OUR ESTIMATES OF THE ANNUAL COST TO THE SOVIETS OF SUPPORTING CUBA AND VIETNAM, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE \$3 BILLION AND \$1 BILLION RESPECTIVELY. AND ALTHOUGH ARMS SALES ELSEWHERE IN THE THIRD WORLD PRODUCE A COUNTER-FLOW OF APPROXIMATELY \$6 BILLION ANNUALLY, SOVIET LEADERS AND MEDIA HAVE RECENTLY BEGUN TO COMPLAIN OPENLY ABOUT THE BURDEN AS A WHOLE.

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UNION WEIGHS THE EXPLOITATION OF ANY PARTICULAR RELATIONSHIP IN THE THIRD WORLD, IT SHOULD FACE THE PROSPECT OF BEARING THE BURDEN OF SUPPORT FOR STATES THAT COOPERATE WITH IT TO HAMPER WESTERN POLICIES. TO LIMIT THE COST OF CHALLENGING OUR INTERESTS, MOSCOW WILL, OF COURSE, TRY TO INSULATE ITS OWN POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THIRD WORLD STATES FROM THE ECONOMIC (AND ESPECIALLY AID) RELATIONSHIPS THAT THESE STATES NOW ENJOY WITH THE WEST. BY CONTRAST, WE SHOULD SEEK TO MAKE SUCH INSULATION DIFFICULT, FOR THIS IS ONE WAY OF MAKING SOVIET ACTIVISM SEEM MORE COSTLY.

THIS PROSPECT MAY AFFECT THE DECISION NOT ONLY OF THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES BUT ALSO OF THEIR WOULD-BE CLIENTS. NEITHER NICARAGUA NOR SYRIA, IN PARTICULAR, HAS HAD TO

FACE UP TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT ITS POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET BLOC WILL COMPROMISE ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH OTHERS: BOTH CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE FROM STATES THAT DO NOT SHARE THEIR GOALS.

C. STABILITY. IT IS OFTEN OBSERVED THAT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT, SO COMMON IN THE THIRD WORLD, CREATES THE INSTABILITY THAT IS THE FERTILE GROUND OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE. ALLEVIATING THESE CONDITIONS IS HELD TO BE THE ONLY LONG-TERM PREVENTIVE MEASURE THAT CAN KEEP EAST-WEST COMPETITION OUT OF THE THIRD WORLD. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS ALSO SAID THAT THE TURMOIL-RIDDEN POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE THIRD WORLD CREATE EVEN MORE PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS THAN THEY DO FOR THE WEST; BECAUSE INSTABILITY MAKES SOVIET REVERSES MORE LIKELY, THE WEST CAN BE LESS FEARFUL OF APPARENT SOVIET GAINS.

EACH OF THESE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES IS PARTLY TRUE, AND HAS SEPARATE IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN POLICY.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES WOULD BE LIMITED IF THE WEST COULD DEVISE FEASIBLE AND EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD. AND "WITHIN OUR MEANS," AS THE SOVIETS SAY, WE DO SO ALREADY: ALTHOUGH ALL WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAVE FOUND IT POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO INCREASE RESOURCES IN THIS AREA, US ECONOMIC AID HAS INCREASED EACH YEAR SINCE 1981 (EVEN AS MANY DOMESTIC EXPENDITURES WERE CUT OUTRIGHT). OUR ATTENTION AT PRESENT HAS HAD TO FOCUS ON TWO ASPECTS OF THIRD WORLD ECONOMIC CONDITIONS: FIRST, HUMANITARIAN -- HOW TO RESPOND TO DETERIORATING CONDITIONS OF LIFE IN THE VERY POOREST NATIONS; AND SECOND, FINANCIAL -- HOW TO AVERT THE POTENTIAL SYSTEMIC IMPACT OF A COLLAPSE BY ANY OF THE MOST OVER-EXTENDED STATES.

THESE MEASURES, HOWEVER, HAVE NARROWED POTENTIAL SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES ONLY IN THE MOST GENERAL, INDIRECT, AND LONG-TERM SENSE. BEYOND SUCH EFFORTS, THE US HAS TARGETED ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR OWN TRADING AND INVESTMENT REGIME IN WAYS THAT COULD HAVE A MAXIMAL IMPACT IN AREAS OF THE HIGH POLICY PRIORITY. WE HAVE PUSHED OUR CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE FORWARD WITH THIS IN MIND. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE TARGETED ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO HELP SPECIFIC GOVERNMENTS (SUCH AS EL SALVADOR, COSTA RICA, THE SUDAN, ETC.) THAT NEED ASSISTANCE IN MAINTAINING SOCIAL STABILITY IN THE FACE OF INTENSE SHORT-TERM

EFFORTS AT DISRUPTION BY SOVIET CLIENTS.

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YET ALTHOUGH THESE POLICIES ARE USEFUL, THEY DO NOT ATTACK THE CORE OF THE SHORT-TERM PROBLEM, WHICH IS NOT LACK OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS BUT POLITICAL CONFLICT, BOTH WITHIN AND AMONG STATES. BECAUSE POLITICAL INSTABILITY CAN ACCOMPANY BOTH ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND STAGNATION ALIKE, POLICIES WITH AN ECONOMIC FOCUS ARE BY THEMSELVES SIMPLY INADEQUATE. BECAUSE POLITICAL INSTABILITY WILL OFTEN BE INCREASED AS A RESULT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, OUR POLICIES MUST BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH SUCH OUTCOMES.

A SIMILAR PROBLEM IS RAISED BY THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL REFORM, WHICH AS A RULE -- AND FOR GOOD REASON -- WE URGE UPON MANY THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS. THE LIBERALIZATION OF HISTORICALLY REPRESSIVE REGIMES WILL FREQUENTLY INCREASE THE CHANCES OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE AND INTERNAL DISINTEGRATION. AS WITH ECONOMIC GROWTH, THEREFORE, WE NEED POLICIES THAT CAN DEAL WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR POLICIES SHOULD THEY SUCCEED, BY HELPING GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE ACCEPTED OUR SUGGESTIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF EL SALVADOR'S PREDICAMENT.

FINALLY, RECOGNIZING THAT THIRD WORLD POLITICAL FLUX CAN IN FACT MAKE SOVIET GAINS TRANSITORY, OUR POLICIES SHOULD TREAT THIS AS A MATTER FOR ACTIVISM RATHER THAN COMPLACENCY. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES HAVE HAD THIS PROBLEM IN MIND. THEY COMMIT THEMSELVES CAUTIOUSLY TO NEW REVOLUTIONARY REGIMES TO SEE WHETHER THEY ARE SECURE. BEHIND THE SOVIETS' RECENT SUPPORT FOR EARLY CREATION OF SOVIET-STYLE INSTITUTIONS IS PRESUMABLY A DESIRE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF FLUX. IF IT CANNOT BE SOLVED, SOVIET INVESTMENTS MAY BE HARDER TO JUSTIFY IN THE FUTURE.

THE WEST THEREFORE NEEDS STRATEGIES THAT MAKE THE CONSOLIDATION OF PRO-SOVIET REGIMES MORE DIFFICULT, PROTRACTED, AND EXPENSIVE, MAKING IT HARDER FOR THEM TO TURN TO DISRUPTIVE EXTERNAL POLICIES. THIS GOAL WILL IN SOME INSTANCES BE BETTER SERVED BY INDUCEMENTS, IN OTHERS BY PRESSURE (SUCH AS SUPPORT FOR NEIGHBORING RIVALS OR EVEN FOR INTERNAL PRO-WESTERN, PRO-DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION GROUPS); IN MOST CASES PERHAPS A COMBINATION OF BOTH WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE. WE WANT TO AVOID DRIVING THIRD WORLD STATES INTO EXCLUSIVE, EAST-OR-WEST ALIGNMENTS, BUT WE SHOULD NOT CONTINUE TO PRETEND THAT THE PROSPECT OF REAL NON-ALIGNMENT EXISTS IN CASES

WHERE IT HAS ALREADY BEEN FORECLOSED.

D. NATIONALISM. BECAUSE THIS IS ONE OF THE PRIME SOURCES OF THE LEGITIMACY (AND SOMETIMES THEREFORE OF THE POWER) OF GOVERNMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, MANY ANALYSES HAVE TREATED NATIONALISM AS A POTENTIALLY EFFECTIVE BARRIER TO SOVIET INFLUENCE AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD. IN THIS VIEW, HOST GOVERNMENTS THAT PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN A QUASI-COLONIALIST ROLE WOULD ONLY JEOPARDIZE THEIR INTERNAL STANDING AND THEREBY THEIR OWN CHANCES OF SURVIVAL. MOREOVER, EVEN WHERE NO NATIONALIST SENTIMENT IS AT WORK, THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS ARE THOUGHT TO BE TOO JEALOUS OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE TO ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE MANIPULATED FOR SOVIET BENEFIT.

THE INCREASED SOVIET USE OF SURROGATES DOES GIVE THIS VIEW SOME SUPPORT; IT IS A BACK-HANDED ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF NATIONALISM'S IMPORTANCE, PARTICULARLY IN COUNTRIES WITH A COLONIAL PAST, WHERE CUBAN FORCES DO NOT BEAR THE TAINT OF GREAT-POWER INTERFERENCE AS SOVIET FORCES

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MIGHT. BUT HOWEVER POTENT THIS NATIONALIST BARRIER MAY BE IN CERTAIN CASES, IT APPEARS TO BE A VERY WEAK CHECK ON SOVIET POLICY AS A WHOLE.

-- IT IS OFTEN OVERRIDDEN BY IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS, WHICH CAN LEGITIMIZE POLICIES THAT NATIONALISM WOULD NOT. THIS IS TRUE IN THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE OF ALL: WERE CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY NOT DRIVEN IN LARGE PART BY IDEOLOGY, IT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE MORE RESISTANT TO SERVING SOVIET INTERESTS.

-- FAR FROM WEAKENING THE APPEAL OF SOVIET BLOC TIES, THE DESIRE FOR SELF-PRESERVATION MAY SOMETIMES IMPEL A THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENT TO STRENGTHEN THEM. THE SANDINISTAS OBVIOUSLY VALUED THEIR CUBAN CONNECTION AS A WAY OF STRENGTHENING THEIR POSITION WITHIN THE POST-SOMOZA RULING COALITION.

-- REGIONAL COMPETITION MAY ALSO OVERCOME THE RELUCTANCE OF OTHERWISE NATIONALIST REGIMES TO ACCEPT AN OUTSIDE PRESENCE. UNLIKE MANY OTHER MIDDLE EAST REGIMES, SYRIA APPEARS TO HAVE HAD NO TROUBLE ACCEPTING 5,000 SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL.

IN SUM, NATIONALISM HAS BEEN NO MORE THAN ONE CONSTRAINT (AND AN OFTEN INEFFECTIVE ONE, AT THAT) ON SOVIET POLICY; AS AN OBSTACLE TO INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IT HAS TO A LARGE EXTENT BEEN CIRCUMVENTED BY

THE USE OF PROXIES. NEVERTHELESS, WHERE POSSIBLE, WESTERN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER ITS WEIGHT AND STABILIZING FORCE CAN BE INCREASED. SOMETIMES THE MOBILIZED PRESSURES OF OTHER STATES IN A REGION, BEING BETTER SITUATED TO MAKE USE OF NATIONALIST APPEALS, CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THIS GOAL. THE BLACK "FRONT-LINE" STATES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA CAN HAVE SOME SUCH INFLUENCE ON ANGOLA, FOR EXAMPLE, AS MAY THE "CONTADORA" GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

MORE GENERALLY, NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE ARE USEFUL THEMES FRAMING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN APPROACHES TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD. DESPITE THE RECORD OF ITS POLICY, THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT ADEQUATELY PERCEIVED AS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTEMPORARY ENEMY OF THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM. THE CONSENSUS DECLARATIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT REGULARLY DISPLAY AN EXPLICITLY ANTI-WESTERN BIAS, WHILE RARELY TAKING AN OPENLY ANTI-SOVIET STANCE. BY ADVERTING TO THIS THEME IN OUR RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING STATES, WESTERN POLICIES SHOULD AIM TO DENY THE SOVIETS THEIR RELATIVE IMMUNITY FROM THE CONDEMNATION OF THE THIRD WORLD.

#### IV. PROSPECTS

OVER THE REMAINDER OF THIS DECADE THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF A FUNDAMENTAL DISCONTINUITY IN SOVIET POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE STRATEGIC MOTIVES THAT HAVE SPURRED SOVIET ACTIVISM WILL NOT ABATE; THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES THAT HAVE SUPPORTED IT WILL NOT DECLINE; AND THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES THAT HAVE FACILITATED IT WILL NOT DISAPPEAR.

THE DEVELOPING STATES, THEN, SEEM LIKELY TO REMAIN AN ARENA OF EAST-WEST COMPETITION. CONTINUING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND OUTLOOK WILL PRECLUDE AN EARLY DOMESTICATION OF SOVIET THIRD WORLD CONDUCT.

AT THE SAME TIME, WHILE THEY ARE IMPORTANT, THE MOTIVES

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UNDERLYING THESE POLICIES ARE NOT THE HIGHEST PRIORITIES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY; THERE IS SOME CHANCE THAT OTHER PREOCCUPATIONS WILL LOOM LARGER. SIMILARLY, SCARCE RESOURCES WILL BE AN INCREASING CONSTRAINT ON THE FURTHER EXPANSION OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES. AND IF THE ONGOING REVITALIZATION OF WESTERN POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD CONTINUES, WE CAN EXPECT SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES TO BE SOMEWHAT NARROWED; AS A RESULT, SOVIET INITIATIVES ARE LIKELY TO SEEM

RISKIER, LESS CERTAIN OF AFFORDABLE SUCCESS.

EVEN IF THESE PRESSURES DO BEGIN TO NARROW THE SCOPE OF SOVIET POLICY SOMEWHAT, SOVIET BEHAVIOR WILL REMAIN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS, AND PERHAPS INCREASINGLY SO, TO HOLD ON TO POSITIONS ACQUIRED AT GREAT COST IN THE PAST, OR TO EXPLOIT NEW OPPORTUNITIES THAT REVEAL SIGNIFICANT WESTERN VULNERABILITY. MOSCOW MAY BE WILLING TO PURSUE A VERY CONFRONTATIONAL LINE. RECENT ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL AMERICA SEEM TO SUPPORT THIS VIEW, ALTHOUGH IN NEITHER CASE HAVE THE SOVIETS SHOWN HOW THEY WILL REACT IF THEIR POLICIES BEGIN TO UNRAVEL AND DANGERS MOUNT. THE REAL TESTS OF SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THEIR CLIENTS PROBABLY LIE AHEAD, AS DO THE TESTS OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO EMPLOY THEIR OWN FORCES IN SITUATIONS WHERE CRITICAL WESTERN INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE. OVER THE COURSE OF THIS DECADE, SUCH TESTS COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH CONTINUED CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA, OR WITH THE BREAKDOWN OF ORDER IN IRAN.

WHATEVER THE OVERALL DIRECTION OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR, THE WEST NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO COUNTER DANGEROUS SOVIET MOVES IN SUCH SITUATIONS, AND TO MAKE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR IN ADVANCE THAT WE WOULD DO SO. OUR ABILITY TO DO SO MAY DEPEND LESS ON OUR RESOLVE IN A MOMENT OF CRISIS THAN ON THE BROAD PATTERN OF POLICIES WE HAVE ESTABLISHED BEFOREHAND. IN THIS RESPECT, THE OUTLOOK IS DISTINCTLY BRIGHTER THAN AT THE END OF THE 70'S. THE WEST'S POSITION IS STRENGTHENING AND THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO THROUGHOUT THE 80'S, IF OUR POLICIES CAN SUPPORT STABLE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTS, PRESERVE AND DEVELOP OUR OWN POLICY INSTRUMENTS, STRENGTHEN THE CONSTRAINTS TO WHICH SOVIET EFFORTS WILL BE SUBJECT, AND WEAKEN THE CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAVE EXTENDED THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD. ESPECIALLY BY MAKING SUCH RELATIONSHIPS A TARGET OF WESTERN POLICY, WE WOULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO MANAGE RISKS IN THE MANNER THAT IT HAS USUALLY PREFERRED. THIS COULD BE THE FIRST STEP IN A DOWNWARD TREND OF AGGRESSIVE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD. END TEXT.

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